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The U.S. economy is moving along quite nicely—if not particularly robustly—and has been
doing so since the official closing of the Great
Recession in July of 2009. We have experienced the
longest economic growth period in U.S. history,
approaching its eleventh year in July. The official
unemployment rate is at a 50-year low, price inflation seems a thing of the past, interest rates have
been at “zero bound” for years, and, until quite
recently, consumer and business confidence have
approached twenty-year highs: for all intents and
purposes, an 11-year Pax Economica, despite the
massive twin deficits here in the U.S., which many
(economists) argue is not a problem in our new
global world. (I happen to think it is.)
It was during this period of growing economic
wealth that Claar and Forster labored for seven
years to explain why this prosperity is meaningless.
The Keynesian Revolution represents a multidisciplinary, panoramic study in support of the book’s
central thesis: that “there is no moral core to our
prosperity” (2) and that Americans are stricken
with an “anxiety of affluence” because “our prosperity is “hollow” and our economy “empty” (4).
This current state of affairs has deep historical
roots; and, channeling Adam Smith, the authors
seek to construct a “dialogue between economics
and moral philosophy” (9) by digging deep to uncover where it was that things went awry. Having
identified the source, they then suggest a cure—an
economic discipline grounded in normative moral
integrity with a teleology of human flourishing.
The heart of the study surrounds the specific
ethical, moral, and cultural nature of what the authors label the “Consumption Paradigm,” a model
of economics that had its origins with well-known
20th-century economic guru John Maynard
Keynes. The authors helpfully prepare readers for
understanding the significance of this reigning
metaphysical construct and just how much of a
historical sea change this turn represents, by walk-

ing them through the history of western economic
thought. This excursion demonstrates just how
much off course the discipline has been blown by
the crosswinds of changing cultural imperatives,
shifting systems of morality, and even radical deviations from what it has always meant to be human.
For the first couple of millennia—essentially
from Socrates to Smith—matters of economics
coalesced around commonly held principles of human nature, morality, and consequence. Despite
the vastly differing metaphysical and epistemological structures inherent in, successively, the ages of
Nature, Revelation (Christian), and Reason, ethics
always mattered. From the early philosophers to
Adam Smith, regardless of humanity’s authority
structure, the grand presupposition of western culture was that of the supremacy of a higher, greater
purpose than existence in the here and now. These
three reigning paradigms agreed here, even if they
differed everywhere else.
It was during the late Enlightenment period—
after Adam Smith—that this grand presupposition
was supplanted by the view that human happiness,
understood as “pleasure or preference-satisfaction” (44), became the new summum bonum. This
marked the abandonment of moral concerns in the
discipline of economics. In applying their thesis to
the here and now, the authors draw from various
representatives —names familiar to any economic
historian—to make the compelling case that the
“American Experiment” represents a curious “hybrid” of these three paradigms. In setting the stage
for what comes next, the rather bold assertion is
made that it was English clergyman and economist
Robert Malthus who subverted the anthropology
of economics from its formerly more elevated and
nobler teleological purpose to one of crass materialism (54).
This spelled the end of moral philosophy in economic (now) science. A new era had been ushered
in, a new economic age of abstractions, deductive
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reasoning, and quantitative analysis. An intellectual battle over economic method ensued where
pride of place was granted to “positive” (over “normative”) economics, with the concomitant disappearance of teleological categories. In fact, the term
“normative” underwent drastic redefinition. It
came to mean “maximizing utility”—satisfying the
all-consuming and insatiable appetite to consume
in the here and now. Economics itself now came
to be repositioned as a “positive” science, a turn
from an inherently moral discipline to one which
was ethically neutral, and this despite ideological
pushback from both the right and the left. Then, in
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries,
many cultural events combined to facilitate Keynes
and the “Keynesian Revolution,” and the economy
became politicized with the growth of state power
following the first world war.
Enter a revised, pleasure-seeking homo economicus and the ushering in of utilitarianism as the
sole purpose and meaning of life. Although by then
not an entirely new anthropology, this reductionistic view of humanity blended well with the moral
and social vision of Keynes, a vision he developed
and nurtured with his Bloomsbury Group association and his personal philosophy and proclivities.
According to the authors, Mill’s already attenuated
and “robotlike” anthropology became an “animalistic” one under Keynes and set the stage for his
Consumption Paradigm, which was perpetuated
and systemically normalized by Keynesian disciples
through the twentieth century. Under the tremendous influence of Paul Samuelson’s introductory
economics textbook in U.S. higher education, this
amoral and a-teleological understanding of economics was not only popularized but became standard economic dogma. The Keynesian revolution
was complete; the counter-revolutions mounted by
the Chicago and Austrian schools were doomed to
failure since their systems accommodated the central tenets of Keynes’ home economicus even as they
chipped away at “subordinate” issues (178). These
systems, too, have reordered the purpose of all
honorable economic enterprise, from one focused
on human progress and flourishing, to one where
consumer appetites represent the singular intrinsic
good.
In their appeal to restore dignity and morality
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to our economic system, the authors articulate a
well-reasoned and certainly appealing prescription
to such a system—“a moral consensus paradigm.”
This model appeals to all who have a concern for
morality and teleology. If the goal of economics is
human flourishing, the recommended paradigm
certainly delivers that. It is a model that applies the
Creator’s image-bearing capacity of all humanity to
economic science. This means recognizing the drive
to be productive and creative; it means circumspect
behavior in our production and consumption activities, which itself will result in stewardship of
creation’s resources; it means recognizing the dignity of all humanity. Only then will the damaging
cultural legacy, with the associated consumerism
and materialism of the Keynesian Revolution, be
overturned.
This historiographical project is a very valuable
one. It is deep and thought-provoking and reminds
the reader to reflect on the ultimacy to which he or
she was created, to have high regard for transcendent reality, to locate all human endeavor within
an epistemological framework that presupposes an
honorable teleology, out of which flow actions in
pursuit of high ends—ultimately, the flourishing of
humanity. For this constant reminder, we owe the
authors a debt of gratitude.
Yet rarely have I read a manuscript that has so
regularly reminded me of Marshall McLuhan’s dictum that “the medium is the message.” The choice
of language and sentiment used to describe Lord
Keynes and his thought is often hyperbolic, even
bordering on the derisive. In describing Keynes’
“animal spirits,” for example (the phrase appears
multiple times in the book, once misspelled at p.
142), the authors characterize Keynes as imbibing
deep in “the darker realms of the human psyche” as
he inhabited the Freudian “psychic netherworld”
and brought the discipline of economics there with
him (112-13).
This read of Keynes is alarmingly disingenuous. The long-established “conventional wisdom”
on this much-quoted Keynes-speak (to use a phrase
popularized by Canadian-American economist
John Kenneth Galbraith, incidentally also not
spared the Claar/Forster censure) is much more
helpful in understanding Keynesianism: “animal
spirits” underscores the capricious and at times ar-

bitrary nature of human behavior. A cursory glance
at the scholarly literature reveals much recent work
on human behavior, economic science, and the
discipline’s fundamental (and surely most heroic)
assumption of the rationality of homo economicus.
Keynes was arguing that aggregate demand in the
economy fluctuates because of (largely irrational)
waves of optimism and pessimism. Perhaps he overstated it—but not all human and economic behavior is rational, as the literature is reminding us.
Much is made of Keynes’ most memorable
phrase “in the long run we’re all dead,” the second
part of which acts as the book’s provocative subtitle. It is employed as the central Keynesian conviction driving the author’s thesis that the Keynesian
revolution is a-teleological. Here is where context
is most important. This catchy assertion is from
Keynes’ 1923 tract on monetary reform: “The long
run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the
long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves
too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons
they can only tell us that when the storm is past the
ocean is flat again.” Ten or so years later this text
received a much more accurate exegesis than that
of Claar/Forster: opposition to relief programs of
President Roosevelt’s New Deal was based on the
mainstream (then classical) argument, voiced by a
U.S. senator, that “the economy will work itself out
in the long run.” One of Roosevelt’s advisors cleverly retorted that “People don’t eat in the long run
senator, they eat every day.” It would be thin gruel
indeed if the comfort extended to the depressionera woman—immortalized by that ionic image
of the Migrant Worker—was only to wait: things
would sort themselves out in the long run. Surely a
person of Keynes’ brilliance would not dismiss all
long-term concerns with such reckless abandon as
suggested by the authors. He spoke in exasperation
on behalf of the hurting unemployed and the deeply suffering in a failing economy. So should we. The
value of this phrase in the book’s entire project is
crushed under the ideological weight the authors
burden it with.
A final reminder of the importance of context
is this: President George W. Bush’s September 21,

2001 address to a joint session of Congress is a veritable paean to American democracy, courage, moral virtue, and the “work, creativity and enterprise”
of the American people. Human flourishing, in
other words. In subsequent speeches he encourages
America not to be cowed by terrorism and intimidated from the regular routine of life. He urged the
adoption of a business-as-usual approach and suggested families continue their common practices of
shopping and confidently travelling by air as part of
that general appeal. The authors lean on the highly
biased and provocative logic Andrew J. Bacevich
(misspelled by the authors) employs to argue that
the 2007 financial meltdown had its roots in Bush’s
post 9/11 exhortation to go to the mall. That this
was patently untrue to the spirit of the President’s
heart should be self-evident. But provocative sound
bites matter.
There are a number of other very significant
issues that unfortunately mar the study, but I am
already over my word limit. I mentioned earlier
this was an ambitious work of historiography. This
particular historiography, although accurate and
very helpful in its retelling of the broad sweep of
intellectual and cultural history, falters in its analysis of Keynesianism and of the hollowness of our
prosperity. The result is an alarmist treatise, a work
which exalts the American Moon Landing as a
notable example of human flourishing, indeed a
project of “transcendent value,” and is mute on the
plight of the poor and the irreparably broken ladder of social and economic mobility in the United
States. Our “empty” economy will have integrity
restored when our wealth is spent on things of value, not on, as Bob Goudzwaard would call them,
“idols of our time.” I’m sure the authors agree with
this principle. I suppose disagreement is over what
those idols are.
Multiple times the authors say this: “We love
economics because we think it matters a lot.” So do
I. Which is why I strongly advise all who have an
interest in our culture and who wish for a more enduring and honorable social philosophy to read this
book. It deserves to be read, but closely and with a
well-developed hermeneutic of suspicion.
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